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Incremental and Incendiary Rhetoric
in Sentencing after Blakely and
Booker
Ronald F. Wright*

I. INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court's decisions in Blakely v. Washington' and
United States v. Booker 2 prompted lots of talk about change in
state and federal sentencing law. How much change in actual
practice do these two cases portend? Some of the rhetoric about
sentencing is incendiary, predicting immediate upheaval and longterm turmoil in sentencing practice across many jurisdictions.
Other assessments use more incremental rhetoric, claiming that
Blakely and Booker do not change the fundamentals of sentencing
law and practice. It all depends on who you ask.
If you ask academics, they say the changes flowing from
Booker and Blakely were huge: our favorite analogies include
earthquakes, revolutions, and train wrecks. 3 But academics
usually see legal change in these grand terms and consistently
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University. I am grateful to David
Zlotnick, David Logan, and the other participants in the Sentencing Rhetoric
symposium at the Roger Williams University School of Law in October 2005.
1. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
2. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
3. See generally Frank 0. Bowman, III, Train Wreck? Or Can the
FederalSentencing System Be Saved? A Plea for Rapid Reversal of Blakely v.
Washington, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 217 (2004); NORA V. DEMLEITNER ET AL.,
SENTENCING
LAW
AND
POLICY
(Supp.
2005-06),
available at
http://sentencing.typepad.com (last visited Jan. 23, 2006). For a convincing
argument that Blakely and Booker will have little real impact on the
involvement of juries in sentencing, see generally Susan R. Klein, The Return
of FederalJudicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REv. 693
(2005).
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underestimate the power of the sprawling criminal justice system
to absorb almost any new thing into something more familiar.
The sentencing rhetoric sounds different, however, when it
comes from sentencing commissioners: they use incremental
language when speaking about sentencing. Interestingly, the
incremental rhetoric comes from commissioners regardless of the
substantive policy objective they are pursuing. If commissioners
want an increased role for juries, they cast that as the outcome
that requires the smallest incremental move from the current
situation. If they advocate an increase in discretion for judges,
then they portray that outcome as the shortest distance away from
current practices. The incremental language applies both to their
descriptions of the current effects of Booker and Blakely ("those
cases did not profoundly change our sentencing system") and to
their descriptions of any preferred changes to the system ("the
proposal would change relatively little from the pre-Blakely status
quo").
This incremental rhetoric from commissions does not usefully
describe the impact of Booker and Blakely on various sentencing
systems. Their language of incrementalism is not meant to
describe the past or present, but is designed instead to shape the
future legislative reaction to this new world. Sentencing
commissioners choose soothing words because most of them do not
want to wake the sleeping legislative dragon. The implicit
message to legislators is: "Nothing to worry about, because
everything is normal, more or less like you left it."
On the other hand, some prosecutors now use incendiary
language to describe the changes in sentencing practice after
Booker and Blakely. In an effort to stir the legislature to action,
they portray the changes as enormous, casting current sentencing
practices as an emergency.
Among judges, the use of rhetoric about sentencing is more
mixed. Some judges use incremental language aimed at other
judges, trying to persuade their fellow judges that the desired
course is a legitimate and restrained one for judges to pursue. In
other cases, judges try to limit the docket impact of the Booker and
Blakely decisions and choose modest language that is best suited
to narrowing the reach of a doctrine and managing a docket. Still
other examples of judicial rhetoric are based on the expectation
that legislators are watching closely and might react badly if they
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do not like what they see.
On the other hand, not all judges use incremental language.
Some are saying, loudly enough for the legislative dragon to hear,
that the time for serious changes in sentencing has arrived.
All told, rhetoric about sentencing after Booker and Blakely
does not serve primarily to describe current sentencing practices
or to predict how the current system will adapt to change in the
short run. The real value of this sentencing language is to reveal
the speaker's perceived relationship with the legislature.
II.

INCREMENTAL RHETORIC FROM THE COMMISSIONS

Sentencing commissions in many states and at the federal
level had to respond to the Supreme Court decisions in Booker and
Blakely. In every case, commissions chose language emphasizing
the limited nature of any changes that the cases created or the
limited costs of their preferred adjustments to bring their systems
back into compliance with the Sixth Amendment. Interestingly,
the same rhetorical strategy played out, regardless of the exact
impact of the cases on the local sentencing rules or the precise
solution that the Commission supported. The soothing rhetoric of
the incremental, above all else, aimed to keep the Commission in
the lead role and to prevent the legislature from re-opening the
deepest questions of sentencing policy.
Minnesota was one of the states most directly affected by the
Blakely decision because its presumptive sentencing guidelines
system could not stand without either increasing the fact-finding
power of juries or decreasing the binding power of the guidelines
on judges. 4 Two months after the Supreme Court decided Blakely,
however, the Minnesota Commission stressed the limited impact
of the decision in Minnesota:
[It] is very apparent that Blakely has changed criminal
sentencing in this country and the magnitude of that
change is something each individual state and the federal
government will need to decipher based on their own
4. See generally Jon Wool, Aggravated Sentencing: Blakely v.
Washington: Legal Considerations for State Sentencing Systems, POL'Y &
PRAC.
REV.
(Vera
Inst.,
Sept.
2004),
available
at

http://www.vera.org/project/projectl3.asp?section-id=38project-id=26&sub_s
ectionid=38 (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
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sentencing structure....
The recent Blakely v. Washington decision directly
impacts neither the constitutionality nor the structure of
the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. However, the
decision does affect certain sentencing procedures
pertaining to aggravated departures and specific sentence
enhancements that will need to be modified to meet the
constitutionality issues identified under Blakely. Those
procedures can be corrected, as demonstrated by the state
of Kansas, who addressed this very issue in 2001, with
limited impact on the criminaljustice system as a whole.
The impact of Blakely on sentencing in Minnesota, while
temporarily disruptive, is limited in scope and can be
addressed within the current sentencing guidelines
5
scheme.
The Commission's report on the impact of Blakely went on to
emphasize that only 7.7 percent of the felony sentences in
Minnesota involved aggravated sentences that potentially raised
Blakely issues, and only 8 percent of those aggravated sentences
(a total of 79 cases in 2002) were resolved at trial rather than
through guilty pleas. 6 In short, the Commission stressed the low
cost of fixing the Blakely problem by adding jury procedures
rather than by changing the basic foundations of the guideline
system, converting them to more voluntary guidelines. The same
calming message reappeared in the Commission's further reports
7
to the legislature in September 2004 and January 2005.

5. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMMISSION, THE IMPACT OF
BLAKELY V. WASHINGTON ON SENTENCING IN MINNESOTA: SHORT TERM

1 (Aug. 6, 2004), available at http://www.msgc.state.
mn.us/Text%20Only/reports to thejlegislature.htm (last visited Jan. 23,
2006) [hereinafter "SHORT TERM REPORT"] (emphasis added).
6. Id. at 5-6.
RECOMMENDATIONS

7. MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES
BLAKELY v. WASHINGTON ON SENTENCING

COMMISSION, THE IMPACT OF
IN MINNESOTA: LONG TERM

2004),
available
at
3
(Sept.
30,
http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/Text%200nly/reports-to thejlegilature.htm
(last visited Jan. 23, 2006) [hereinafter "LONG TERM REPORT"] ("The number
of affected cases is limited and will not constitute a crisis within the state....
This report contains recommendations that outline procedures to be
implemented that will address the constitutional issues raised in Blakely and
still permit sentencing to continue under the state's current sentencing
RECOMMENDATIONS
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While sending reassuring signals about the limited cost of
new jury proceedings, the Minnesota report ignored some
potentially enormous loose ends. Two features of the Minnesota
system-probation revocations and an enhancement for
committing a crime while still on probation, parole, or supervised
release-might trigger the Blakely jury requirement and
enormously increase the number of affected cases. The various
Minnesota reports mentioned these possibilities, but in each case
the discussion appeared late in the report in a brief discussion
that contained no estimates of the numbers of cases.8 The reports
kept these larger effects out of the spotlight.
The same patterns of rhetoric also appear in states where the
speaker seeks an outcome entirely different from the one that the
Minnesota commission favored. For example, in Tennessee, an ad
hoc Governor's Task Force pushed for more voluntary guidelines.
They cast new jury proceedings as a dangerous and possibly
expensive departure from known practices: "Although we
recommend necessary changes, the essential components of this
proposed Act will retain the policies and purposes of the 1989 Act
that have served our State well."9
The United States Sentencing Commission has spoken
cautiously, issuing relatively few reports or public statements
about the operation of federal sentencing post-Booker. In a new
series of monthly statistical reports, the Commission tracks some
scheme.").
The Supreme Court's decision in Blakely did not rule determinate
sentencing unconstitutional, nor did it rule aggravated departures
unconstitutional. What the Court's ruling did indicate was that the
state's current procedure for imposing aggravated departures and
statutorily enhanced sentences is unconstitutional. The proposed
modifications address those procedural issues while preserving the
ability to impose aggravated departures in cases when appropriate
and necessary to protect public safety.
MINNESOTA
LEGISLATURE

SENTENCING

GUIDELINES

COMMISSION,

REPORT

TO

THE

1, 5-6 (Jan. 2005), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/
Text%200nly/reports-to thejlegislature.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2006)
[hereinafter "ANNUALREPORT"] (emphasis added).
8. See SHORT TERM REPORT, supra note 5, at 9-10; LONG TERM REPORT,
supra note 7, at 7; ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 5.
9.

REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON THE USE OF ENHANCEMENT

FACTORS

IN

CRIMINAL

SENTENCING

3

(Feb.

17,

2005),

available at

http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/geninfo/PRESSREL/2004/Blakely/sentencingdocum
ent%202-16-05.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
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changes in practice without characterizing the importance or
likely source of the change.10
The few public statements from commissioners have
emphasized the need for careful, controlled changes to the system.
A statement from Judge Ricardo Hinojosa, the Chair of the
Commission, on the day after the release of the Booker decision
put it this way:
The U.S. Sentencing Commission is in a unique position
to continue to assist all three branches of government
during this period of transition. [The Commission] will
continue to fulfill its statutorily mandated functions such
as collecting sentencing data from all federal district
courts, amending the guidelines where appropriate, and
conducting sentencing-related research. 1 '
Judge Hinojosa's testimony to Congress in February 2005
emphasized that "guidelines still must be calculated and
considered," and that "sentencing guidelines should be given
substantial weight," two propositions that emphasize continuity in
the system.' 2 The testimony also pointed to an incrementalist
bottom line: "If Congress decides at some point to pursue
legislation, we hope that it will preserve the core principles of the
Sentencing Reform Act and, to the extent possible, avoid a
wholesale rewriting of a system that has operated well for nearly
13
two decades."

10.

U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT

(Nov.
10,
2005),
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/
PostBookerll005.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2006). The statistics appear in a
format that emphasizes continuity between practices in 2003 and 2005,
presenting the total percentage of "within guideline" sentences for each time
period, rather than calculating the percentage increase in judicial decisions to
sentence outside the guidelines.
11. News Release, U.S. Sentencing Commission, U.S. Sentencing
Commission Chair Comments on High Court Ruling (Jan. 13, 2005),
http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rel011305.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
12. Judge Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair, United States Sentencing
Commission, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security Committee on the Judiciary United States House of
Representatives,
at
5-6
(Feb.
10,
2005),
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/bookertestimony.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
13. Id.
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INCENDIARY RHETORIC FROM PROSECUTORS

The soothing rhetoric from sentencing commissions contrasts
neatly with the words of alarm that prosecutors use when they
describe the effects of Blakely and Booker. Prosecutors and others
who want to rouse the legislative dragon argue that sentencing
law needs immediate action. They cast the current situation as a
major change from past practice and call for the legislature to
restore the system to its happier status before the Supreme Court
intervened. As with sentencing commissions, this rhetoric applies
regardless of the precise substantive changes to sentencing law
that the speaker seeks. The incendiary language about the
present and the appeal to restore better days from the past aims
for dramatic legislative action.
The best current example of such rhetoric comes from U.S.
Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, who diagnosed federal
sentencing problems in a speech to a victims' rights group:
[The] mandatory guidelines system is no longer in place
today, and I believe its loss threatens the progress we
have made in ensuring tough and fair sentences for
federal offenders....
More and more frequently, judges are exercising their
discretion to impose sentences that depart from the
carefully considered ranges developed by the U.S.
Sentencing Commission. In the process, we risk losing a
sentencing system that requires serious sentences for
serious offenders and helps prevent disparate sentences
for equally serious crimes....
The federal sentencing guidelines were the result of
Republicans and Democrats coming together in response
to the high crime rates of the 1960s and 1970s to create
14
an invaluable tool of justice.
Attorney General Gonzales went on to endorse a restructuring
of the guideline system, using guidelines without lids as the best
14. Alberto Gonzales, U.S. Attorney General, Prepared Remarks,
Sentencing Guidelines Speech, Washington, D.C. (June 21, 2005), available

at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2005/06212005victimsofcrime.htm

visited Jan. 20, 2006).

(last
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way to "restore fairness and consistency in sentencing." 15 It is not
surprising that prosecutors would invite legislatures to change
sentencing laws, since there are powerful long-term trends that
reinforce an alliance between legislators and prosecutors on
16
criminal justice matters.
IV. MIXED JUDICIAL RHETORIC

While prosecutors and sentencing commissioners have used
fairly consistent rhetoric about their sentencing systems, judges
have adopted many different rhetorical styles to describe
sentencing law and practice. This mixed use of sentencing
language reflects the eclectic views among judges about their
relationship with the legislature on sentencing matters.
Some judges believe that an overt discussion between judges
and the legislature about sentencing policy is not within the
judge's job description. Consequently, they have used language
aimed only to convince other judges how to remain true to the
existing law or how to manage the challenges of a crowded judicial
docket. For example, when judges have discussed the availability
of appellate review for defendants who did not raise jury trial
rights in their appeals filed before the release of the Blakely or
Booker decisions, they have asked whether the constitutional
defect was serious enough to amount to "plain error" that an
appellate court can hear even in the absence of an explicit
reservation of the issue by the defendant. In most federal courts,
the appellate judges have ruled that the error is not "plain." The
more incremental characterization of the legal error kept the
15. Id. (".... the sentencing court would be bound by the guidelines
minimum, just as it was before the Booker decision. The guidelines
maximum, however, would remain advisory, and the court would be bound to
consider it, but not bound to adhere to it, just as it is today under Booker.).
16. See William Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100
MICH. L. REV. 505, 546-56 (2002). As I have argued elsewhere, Stuntz may
have overstated his argument in the context of sentencing law, as opposed to
the coverage of the substantive criminal law. See generally Ronald F. Wright,
Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public Choice
Theory, 90 IowA L. REV. 219 (2004). Stuntz also fails to account for the
interesting variety of political experience in various states when it comes to
sentencing legislation. Stuntz's general point about a long-term political
alliance between prosecutors and legislators, however, explains nicely the
general enthusiasm among prosecutors for legislative leadership in the
response to Blakely and Booker.
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17
impact on the appellate docket much smaller.
Similarly, many discussions of "reasonableness" review in the
federal courts have involved an intramural conversation among
judges. In an effort to convince their fellow judges that their own
version of reasonableness review is legitimate, some judges have
pointed out how their preferred standards allow judges to make
18
familiar judgments without transforming the sentencing world.
Other judges, however, have minimized the changes that the
Blakely and Booker cases brought to sentencing as a way to
prevent or moderate legislative action. Several state supreme
courts have interpreted their state laws in unlikely ways to avoid
any impact at all from Blakely.1 9 It is easy to imagine some
wishful thinking at work in these judicial rulings, a hope that the
state's sentencing system could avoid the turmoil that would
happen if the legislature had to revamp an invalidated system.
More overtly, some judges have pointed out that sentencing
practices are more likely to provoke legislative action if judges
depart too often and too far from established sentencing patterns.
Take, for instance, Judge Paul Cassell's defense of his decision to
accord great weight to the federal sentencing guidelines, even
though the Booker opinion made the guidelines somewhat less
binding:
The congressional view of how to structure that
sentencing system will surely be informed by how judges
respond to their newly-granted freedom under the
"advisory" Guidelines system. If that discretion is
exercised responsibly, Congress may be inclined to give
judges greater flexibility under a new sentencing system.
On the other hand, if that discretion is abused by
sentences that thwart congressional objectives, Congress
has ample power to respond with mandatory minimum
20
sentences and the like.

17. See United States v. Rodriguez-Gutierrez, 428 F.3d 201, 204-06 (5th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Thompson, 422 F.3d 1285, 1300-02 (11th Cir.
2005).
18. See United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 607-08 (7th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 114-20 (2d Cir. 2005).
19. See State v. Gomez, 163 S.W.3d 632, 648-62 (Tenn. 2005); People v.
Black, 113 P.3d 534 (Cal. 2005).
20. United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 931-32 (D. Utah 2005).
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Finally, there are judges who knowingly raise the rhetorical
temperature, likely aware that their language will open a policy
discussion with legislators. 21 For instance, a number of judges
have refused to impose guideline sentences in crack cocaine cases
because those penalties are so much heavier than the penalties for
comparable amounts of powder cocaine. After reviewing the
original 1986 legislation that first created the 100:1 ratio between
penalties for crack and powder cocaine, one judge noted the lack of
any justification for this ratio in the legislative history, tracked
the harmful consequences of this ratio, and declared sentences
based on this weighting scheme to be "unreasonable" under
22
Section 3553(a).
These last two categories-judges who adopt either
incremental or incendiary rhetoric with an awareness that
Congress is watching closely-are a sign of the times. In matters
of criminal sentencing, as in several other subject areas, judges
today must act with an awareness that the legislature returns to
these questions time and again. Any judicial pronouncements (but
especially the boldest pronouncements) are bound to bring forth a
legislative reply. Judicial rulings cannot afford to ignore
legislative responses on topics where the two branches will likely
interact over and over again.
These judicial announcements could be likened to "clear
statement rules," pushing statutes in particular directions and
insisting that the legislature work exceptionally hard to push the
policy back in the opposite direction. 23 More generally, these
2005).
21. For examples among state courts, see generally State v. Natale, 878
A.2d 724 (N.J. 2005); State v. Allen, 615 S.E.2d 256 (N.C. 2005).
22. See United States v. Smith, 359 F. Supp. 2d 771, 777-82 (E.D. Wis.
2005) (Adelman, J.); see also United States v. Perry, 389 F. Supp. 2d 278, 300
(D.R.I. 2005) (in context of reducing guideline sentence based on
unreasonableness of crack-powder distinction, court reviews federal
sentencing data regarding number of sentences imposed within guideline
boundaries: "Given that judges presently enjoy complete discretion regarding
whether or not to follow the Guidelines, this change is arguably modest and
demonstrates both judicial restraint and respect for the overarching goals of
the Sentencing Reform Act, consistency and fairness across the system."). But
see United States v. Pho, No. 05-2455, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 153 (1st Cir.
Jan. 5, 2006) (holding that district courts cannot reject the 100:1 ratio).
23. Cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (clear statement
rule disfavoring readings of statutes that could alter the usual constitutional
balance between state and federal governments); Atascadero State Hospital
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rulings create necessary devices for communication among some of
the major actors in sentencing policy, creating a "common law of
24
sentencing for an age of statutes."
V. CONCLUSION

In the world of sentencing after Blakely and Booker, rhetoric
reveals a relationship. Sentencing commissioners, who cast
sentencing changes as small and manageable, perceive that
legislative action takes the policy initiative out of their hands.
Prosecutors, who cast sentencing changes as large and
threatening, calculate that their perennial allies in the legislature
will refashion the sentencing laws in ways that favor them.
Meanwhile, judges have yet to find a consistent rhetorical voice
because they have not yet worked out a relationship with the
legislature. In the long run, judicial rhetoric that shows an
awareness of the legislature and a willingness to offer judicial
input on sentencing policy will serve us best.

v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 237-40 (1985) (clear statement rule disfavoring
congressional abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity).
24. Cf GUIDO CALABRESi, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982); Norval Morris, Towards Principled Sentencing, 37 MD. L. REv. 267
(1977); Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age of Federal
Sentencing: The Opportunity and Need for Judicial Lawmaking, 11 STAN. L.
& POLY REV. 93, 99-100 (1999).

